Showing posts with label STM. Show all posts
Showing posts with label STM. Show all posts

Monday, December 31, 2018

STM, Mu, Chaos

This should be my last blog of 2018, so I'll keep it short.

I just wanted to note a couple of news items on the SMI Transfer Monitor which I long ago noted in https://firmware.intel.com/content/smi-transfer-monitor-stm. The NSA's evolution of the design as a checker was described earlier this year https://www.platformsecuritysummit.com/2018/speaker/myers/ and now has a public example https://github.com/EugeneDMyers/STM. This work, along with the patches to Xen to support the launch of the STM https://github.com/PPerfLab/xen/tree/stm-optin provides an exciting example of this technology being enabled.

Speaking of SMM, an interesting study of building systems without SMM was mentioned by an Intel colleague in the OCP talk described at https://firmwaresecurity.com/2018/12/30/alternatives-for-smm-usage-in-intel-platforms/. As opposed to jailing SMM code with an STM, this approach speaks to alternatives to implement capabilities formerly found in OEM SMM code in UEFI runtime and other portions of the platform.

Beyond the STM there is other interesting happenings in the world of open source firmware, including Microsoft's 'Project Mu' described in the blog posting
https://blogs.windows.com/buildingapps/2018/12/19/%E2%80%AFintroducing-project-mu/ and represented by various Github repositories https://github.com/topics/projectmu. There are interesting elements to be found, including test infrastructure https://github.com/Microsoft/mu_basecore/tree/release/201808/MsUnitTestPkg and https://github.com/Microsoft/mu_plus/tree/release/201808/UefiTestingPkg. On the security front, UEFI crypto interfaces https://github.com/Microsoft/mu_plus/tree/release/201808/MsCorePkg/MuCryptoDxe and a secure configuration infrastructure https://github.com/Microsoft/mu_plus/blob/release/201808/DfciPkg/Dfci_Feature.md for zero touch management can be found. These packages meet the spirit of the more 'code first' methodology I mentioned on slide 15 of http://www.uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/UEFI_Plugfest_VZimmer_Fall_2016.pdf, for example. I've been told that although some folks in the Redmond area refer to UEFI as YOO-FEE https://vzimmer.blogspot.com/2018/03/open-platforms-and-21-or.html, no one refers to Project Mu as MOO-FEE.

Regarding EFI topics on Github, I opined about the EFI Byte Code (EBC) many years ago http://vzimmer.blogspot.com/2015/08/efi-byte-code.html, including challenges with natural integers, so I was happy to hear about an open source compiler with an EBC back-end https://github.com/retrage/elvm/tree/retrage/ebc-v2. I haven't dug in to see how they handle the sizeof(INTN) issue or if they just support x64. Either way, good stuff seeing the open source community pick up on this gap.

For my final topic I'd like to cover a talk from the Chaos Communications Conference (CCC). Watching this over the holiday has been a ritual of mine since I learned of talks like Trammell's Thunderstrike talk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TsRt76v8gPQ in 2014. This year's talk of interest was https://media.ccc.de/v/35c3-9778-open_source_firmware given by the organizer of OSFC https://osfc.io/ Zaolin. He mentioned the EFI on U-Boot work https://www.suse.com/media/article/UEFI_on_Top_of_U-Boot.pdf, which I find valuable since having alternate clean-room implementations helps increase the quality of the standard. Without alternate implementations, a single code base can become the de facto standard (recall the byte swap bug from my last blog). A couple of the data items were a bit off, though, such as the timeline with  "1998 Apple EFI by Intel" when Apple didn't convert to EFI until the x86 transition in 2005 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macintosh.



The PowerPC Macs prior to the transition used Open Firmware based upon Forth. Maybe the first article in https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/research/2011-vol15-iss-1-intel-technology-journal.pdf can provide a better timeline? Beyond small nits like the latter, though, it was a great talk and advocacy for more openness in firmware. This blog also had a short mention in the talk, too.



Other talks at CCC I liked include https://hackaday.com/2018/12/31/35c3-safe-and-secure-drivers-in-high-level-languages/ which reinforces the argument around using safer languages in low-level code like device drivers. And of course I cannot forget Trammell's talk https://media.ccc.de/v/35c3-9597-modchips_of_the_state. It was a definite counterpoint to the Portland BSides panel https://bsidespdx.org/events/2018/speakers.html on this topic. When I asked Joe F. about the variety of panel members he smiled and replied "yes, we have diversity. Some of the panel members have beards, some don't." Ah, 2019.

Here's looking forward to a safe and productive 2019.

© 2018, Vincent Zimmer. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 License











Tuesday, April 26, 2016

Open source platforms, FSP consumers, FSP producers, and STM updates

Overview
You've seen in the past when I have talked about Intel Firmware Support Package (FSP), hearkening back to 2014 [1][2]. There are 2 parts to FSP - the Consumer or use of the FSP in a platform, and the production or creation of an FSP binary.  We'll review examples of each in turn below, in addition to some updates since the 2015 IDF prezo.

By the way, some of these items were also posted to [22] but the latest posting seems to have disappeared.  As such, if you've already read some of this from that site, feel free to skip over the duplicate material.

FSP Consumer
We're posting an updated platform using the 1.1 FSP [3][4]. This tree moves beyond the Baytrail work in [2] and includes Braswell [5]. A good overview of porting the tree is provided, too [6]. This shows some of the best practices on building EDKII on top of FSP. Specifically, the only macrocode binary is in the Intel FSP, with the rest of the EDKII code to provide the core UEFI & PI services, along with the platform initialization, in open source.

This is an important step to show how FSP + open source can be used to build a full solution, or EDKII can'Consume' an FSP binary. This provides parallel work-flows to things like a coreboot Braswell solution [13], for example, that also builds upon Intel FSP. Turing equivalence argues that it is all 'just code', so we want to show a few 'equivalences' here.

This is a work in progress that should eventually migrate to [11], but in the interim take a look and provide feedback on some of the code partitioning and design.

Speaking of coreboot, EDKII and FSP, my colleague Lee Leahy [23] and I are slated to talk at the upcoming coreboot conference [24]. We'll review the EDKII CorebootPayloadPkg [26] at [25].

FSP Producer
In addition to the Intel Atom based platform that consumes an Intel FSP binary from [12], there has been a lack of public demonstration of producing an Intel FSP, as described in [2]. This is by design in the sense that the Intel FSP encapsulates matter that does not have public documentation, thus cannot be open sourced. This poses the challenge of how to provide guidance on how to create an Intel FSP. This is where the Intel Quark EDKII code comes into play. Since the low-level silicon initialization, including memory initialization, is already open source, the project providesan opportunity to show how to create an Intel FSP [7]. Luckily we now have an early example of this in public view [8].
I look forward to future platforms that move beyond FSP 1.1, too [10]. And to that end, the FSP 2.0 specification is now live [27], along with the Boot Setting File (BSF) specification [28] that has been used in all of FSP 1.0, 1.1, and now 2.0.

Good stuff.

STM
Speaking of good stuff, here are some updates following last year's IDF prezo [19], including the SMI Transfer Monitor (STM) mentioned at [14]. Specifically, you can now find the STM source code on a public repository [15]. In addition to the documents on the STM itself [21] and the original STM [20], there is also another virtualization technology shared in the repo that wasn't in [20] release, namely the DMA protection work described in [16] which can be found at [17]. This complements the host-based protection of the FRM [18] with some protection from I/O devices performing errant DMA transactions.

Conclusion
You'll hopefully observe a theme here of having more open source platform solutions, including protection technology. This is one way to engage with the community and reduce the barriers to providing robust, transparent platform solutions.

References
[1] Zimmer, "EDKII, FSP, and other topics", blog posting, September, 2014
https://firmware.intel.com/blog/edkii-fsp-and-other-topics

[2] Zimmer, "Firmware Flexibility using Intel(R) Firmware Support Package," Intel Developer Forum,
September 2014
https://firmware.intel.com/sites/default/files/SF14_STTS001_Intel%28R%29_FSP.pdf

[3] Yao, et al, "A Tour Beyond BIOS Using the Intel(R) Firmware Support Package 1.1 with the EFI Developer Kit II," April 2015
https://firmware.intel.com/sites/default/files/resources/A_Tour_Beyond_BIOS_Creating_the_Intel_Firmware_Support_Package_Version_1_1_with_the_EFI_Developer_Kit_II.pdf

[4] Intel Firmware Support Specification External Architecture Specification (EAS), Version 1.1a, November 2015
http://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/technical-specifications/fsp-architecture-spec-v1-1a.pdf

[5] Braswell EDKII project, April 2016
https://github.com/mangguo321/Braswell

[6] Wei, et al, "Open Braswell UEFI Codebase - Design and Porting Guide," February 2016
https://github.com/mangguo321/Braswell/blob/master/Documents/Open_Braswell_Platform_Designing_Porting_Guide.pdf

[7] Yao, et al, "A Tour Beyond BIOS Creating the Intel(R) Firmware Support Package 1.1 with the EFI
Developer Kit II, April 2015
https://firmware.intel.com/sites/default/files/resources/A_Tour_Beyond_BIOS_Creating_the_Intel_Firmware_Support_Package_Version_1_1_with_the_EFI_Developer_Kit_II.pdf

[8] Quark FSP 1.1, April 2016
https://github.com/feizwang/quarkfsp

[9] Quark SOC code
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/tree/master/QuarkSocPkg

[10] Intel FSP2.0 consumer code, March 2016
https://github.com/jyao1/FSP2.0

[11] EDKII project www.tianocore.org

[12] Intel Firmware Support Package (FSP)
intel.com/fsp

[13] coreboot Braswell code that consumes Intel FSP 1.1, April 2016
https://github.com/coreboot/coreboot/tree/master/src/soc/intel/braswell

[14] SMI Transfer Monitor (STM) overview, August 2015
https://firmware.intel.com/blog/stm-updates
http://vzimmer.blogspot.com/2015/08/smi-transfer-monitor-stm-unleashed.html

[15] STM Source code, March 2016
https://github.com/jyao1/STM

[16] Yao, Zimmer, "A Tour Beyond BIOS Using Intel(R) VT-d for DMA Protection in a UEFI BIOS," January 2015, https://firmware.intel.com/sites/default/files/resources/A_Tour_Beyond_BIOS_Using_Intel_VT-d_for_DMA_Protection.pdf

[17] DMA Package https://github.com/vincentjzimmer/STM/tree/master/Test/DmaPkg

[18] Yao, Zimmer, "A Tour Beyond BIOS Launching a VMM in EFI Developer Kit II," September 2015, https://firmware.intel.com/sites/default/files/A_Tour_Beyond_BIOS_Launching_VMM_in_EFI_Developer_Kit_II_0.pdf

[19] Zimmer, "STTS003 - Developing Best-in-Class Security Principles with Open Source Firmware", Intel Developer Forum (IDF), San Francisco, August 2015
https://firmware.intel.com/sites/default/files/STTS003%20-%20SF15_STTS003_100f.pdf

[20] STM 1.0 August 2015
https://firmware.intel.com/sites/default/files/STM_Release_1.0.zip

[21] Yao, Zimmer, "A Tour Beyond BIOS Launching STM to Monitor SMM in EDK II", August 2015 https://firmware.intel.com/sites/default/files/A_Tour_Beyond_BIOS_Launching_STM_to_Monitor_SMM_in_EFI_Developer_Kit_II.pdf

[22] https://firmware.intel.com/blog

[23] coreboot Quark FSP MemoryInit support, January 2016 https://www.coreboot.org/pipermail/coreboot-gerrit/2016-January/039748.html

[24] coreboot convention 2016 https://www.coreboot.org/Coreboot_conference_San_Francisco_2016
https://calendar.google.com/calendar/embed?src=6b1u8iq13jj8cp6kfokq4vlo20%40group.calendar.google.com&ct=America/Los_Angeles&dates=20160612/20160616&mode=agenda

[25] EDKII CorebootPayloadPkg overview, June 14, 2016 https://calendar.google.com/calendar/embed?src=6b1u8iq13jj8cp6kfokq4vlo20%40group.calendar.google.com&ct=America/Los_Angeles&dates=20160612/20160616&mode=agenda

[26] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/tree/master/CorebootPayloadPkg

[27] Intel Firmware Support Package (FSP) 2.0 Specification, April 2016
https://firmware.intel.com/sites/default/files/FSP_EAS_v2.0_Draft%20External.pdf

[28] Boot Setting File (BSF) Specification version 1.0, March 2016
https://firmware.intel.com/sites/default/files/BSF_1_0.pdf 

Tuesday, August 18, 2015

SMI Transfer Monitor (STM) Unleashed

I'm happy to announce today that the SMI Transfer Monitor (STM) documentation and code have been released today. This aligns with my Intel Developer Forum (IDF) presentation "STTS003 - Developing Best-in-Class Security Principles with Open Source Firmware." that is now available from http://www.intel.com/idfsessionsSF.

The information can be found at https://firmware.intel.com/content/smi-transfer-monitor-stm and includes the source code of: 1) the STM, 2) a small virtualization pre-OS agent for launch/test, and 3) platform code to adapt the STM on a MinnowBoard Max platform. All of these elements are built using EDK II https://github.com/tianocore/edk2 technology.

The flow of the STM to virtualize a system management interrupt (SMI) can be seen in the figure below from my IDF presentation.

The STM is ideally suited to work with a Intel (R) Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) launch, but the recently released specification includes chapter 12 of https://firmware.intel.com/sites/default/files/STM_User_Guide-001.pdf https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/stm-user-guide-001-819978.pdf for a VT-only usage. This allows for investigation and research around this technology on any system with Intel Virtualization Technology (VT) support, such as MinnowBoard Max https://firmware.intel.com/blog/security-technologies-and-minnowboard-max.

We created a companion document https://firmware.intel.com/sites/default/files/A_Tour_Beyond_BIOS_Launching_STM_to_Monitor_SMM_in_EFI_Developer_Kit_II.pdf https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/a-tour-beyond-bios-launching-stm-to-monitor-smm-in-efi-developer-kit-ii-819978.pdf to describe the reference implementation https://firmware.intel.com/sites/default/files/STM_Release_1.0.zip. This document was written in the spirit of our other "Tour" documents that dive into various implementation choices https://firmware.intel.com/blog/beyond-bios.

This is a preview release of the code that matches the 1.0 specification. Longer-term we intend to migrate this capability to the http://www.tianocore.org open source firmware community, especially given the fact that the STM is intended to be integrated within the firmware. Some of the choices in the preview release included duplicating some of the EDKII base library so that the STM can be produced only by using code within the STM.zip. Going forward it may make sense to use the existing MdePkg code, possibly accreting more virtualization-specific functions, for example.

This EDKII usage on MinnowBoard Max represents only one design integration choice, too. The STM specification and resultant STM binary derived from the source code could be integrated into a EDKI, PC/AT or coreboot-based platform initialization code. The STM binary would interact with EDKII PI, PC/AT, coreboot, or other system board firmware via the interfaces defined in the 1.0 STM User Guide.

There are some other interesting announcements from IDF that I will blog about later, including exciting advances in network boot. For now, though, take a look at the STM specification and code. Any feedback will be appreciated, too.







Wednesday, December 31, 2014

Regarding a prediction for 2015

Given it is the final day of 2014, I thought that my final blog of 2014 would treat the year.next which commences in a few hours, maybe with another one of my infamous TL:DR-style postings? Specifically, I'd like to build upon missive from Tim Lewis at http://uefi.blogspot.com/2014/10/security-to-eclipse-user-features-as.html wherein he shared his belief that security concerns in the platform firmware will predominate as the top user story of 2015. Given the sampling below from 2014, he may be observing an unenviable trend line.

Regarding that trend, there have been talks at several venues in 2014, such as the Black Hat (BH) talks a few months ago https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Kallenberg-Extreme-Privilege-Escalation-On-Windows8-UEFI-Systems.pdf. This talk had an associated CVE http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/552286 and white paper https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/14-2221-extreme-escalation.pdf.

In addition, just this week there were a couple of talks featured on UEFI at the Chaos Communications Conference (CCC), including https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5BrdX7VdOr0 and the associated presentation https://frab.cccv.de/system/attachments/2557/original/AttacksOnUEFI_Slides.pdf
by researchers from Bromium and Mitre, respectively.

The other CCC talk was on EFI and Thunderbolt https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5BrdX7VdOr0. Glad to hear from the Matthew Garrett question to the presenter near the end of the talk that the option ROM vulnerability could have been mitigated if the Apple platforms implemented UEFI Secure Boot with option ROM verification (i.e., UEFI Driver Loading) enabled.

These security events and broad use of UEFI and edk II-based platforms definitely argue for the need to have additional industry coordination. This is a role that CERT has done admirably, but as Tim noted, they are now joined by the UEFI Security Response Team (USRT) http://www.uefi.org/security. This effort has been followed by a more code base-specific effort, too http://tianocore.sourceforge.net/wiki/Security. I am happy to be involved in both and although my CVSS-Fu isn't too evolved yet, I'm trying my best in writing technical advisories and doing the associated grading.

It is interesting that the references for both BH and CCC  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5BrdX7VdOr0 talks above cite the Intel Framework Specifications at www.intel.com and not the superseding UEFI Platform Initialization (PI) specifications http://www.uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/PI_Spec_1.3.zip. This might contribute to some of the ambiguity seen in the boot script implementations, for example, noted in the CCC talk, since the Intel Framework specifications are frozen after having been contributed to the UEFI Forum. Maybe posting a ZIP of the PI specs and a PDF of the Framework makes the latter more search-engine friendly?

For the CCC talk https://frab.cccv.de/system/attachments/2557/original/AttacksOnUEFI_Slides.pdf, it was good to see that slide 53 mentions the work done with my Intel colleague

      [11] A Tour Beyond BIOS:
      Implementing S3 Resume with EDK2 –JiewenYao and Vincent Zimmer,
      October 2014

Jiewen and I designed features like the Lock Box protocol https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-MdeModulePkg/blob/master/Include/Protocol/LockBox.h to allow for protecting the boot script memory, via SMM or other container, back in 2009. But issues in seeing the protections deployed are compounded by the sheer difficulty in implementing S3 resume in platforms. Specifically, getting the functionality correct and having less-easily testable properties like securing the boot script has proven challenging. As a platform developer the last call you want to hear during product development is from the SQA team, saying "Everything works great, but our S3 resume testing fails once out of 10,000 times."

The above S3 document represents part of an effort to document some of the design intent on edk II source artifacts. We already have architectural intent documents such as http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~kubitron/courses/cs194-24-S14/hand-outs/SF09_EFIS001_UEFI_PI_TCG_White_Paper.pdf (including the companion talk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lZ505uz1TZ4).

Regarding other defenses, in the S3 talk Corey also mentioned the "SMI Transfer Monitor" (STM). Corey's co-presenter Rafal discusses the STM in more detail at http://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/bh09dc/Attacking%20Intel%20TXT%20-%20paper.pdf. This is also mentioned in CCC 2013 talk http://events.ccc.de/congress/2013/Fahrplan/system/attachments/2266/original/Gal_Diskin_-_Virtually_Impossible_-_30C3__release_version_.pdf by former Intel researcher Gal Diskin.on slide 13. Chapter 13 of Grawrock's 2nd edition of Safe Computing http://www.amazon.com/Dynamics-Trusted-Platform-Building-Approach/dp/1934053171 also describes this feature. The gist of the STM is that it represents a usage of the peer-monitor capability in IA32, a hardware feature defined in chapter 34.15 of the Intel Software Development Manual (SDM) https://www-ssl.intel.com/content/www/us/en/processors/architectures-software-developer-manuals.html. There is a nice peer monitor overview at http://virtualizationtechnologyvt.blogspot.com/2011/07/vmx-and-smm-dual-monitor-mode.html. The use of the peer monitor, which is essentially virtualization controls in System Management Mode (SMM), allows for de-privileging today's ring 0 SMM code, such as that built responsive to the infrastructure in volume 4 of the PI 1.3 specification http://www.uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/PI_Spec_1.3.zip. So when Corey said "where is the STM specification?", he was referring to the firmware convention for loading the STM, interaction with Intel TXT, and how to expose resource lists for which the guest SMM code can access. This class of firmware interaction is the "STM specification" and it is built upon the hardware specifications of the peer monitor virtualization capability treated in the SDM. The SDM is the bible for software-visible parts of IA32, i.e., the 'architecture.' The SDM hasn't changed over the last decade plus, whereas the STM specification has, er, evolved. 

I have spent quite a bit of time on SMM over the last decade plus, from having defined the Framework SMM CIS http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/processors/itanium/efi-smm-cis-v09.html infrastructure http://www.google.com/patents/US6848046, from which the present PI 1.3 SMM design has been derived, to collaborating on peer monitor and STM work. I'm a big fan of isolation technologies and trusted computing, but I'll have to pause here for this 2014 entry on this topic. If I were a smarter guy I would follow in the foot-steps of Fermat's Last Theorem and claim to have the final proof of solving the SMM security issues but excuse myself for today by noting that the answer is "too large to fit in the margin" of this blog http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fermat%27s_Last_Theorem.

Just as a document cannot replace well commented codes, having more executable methods for assurance are always preferred. These include efforts such as the CHIPSEC work https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec which I also describe in http://www.uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/2014_UEFI_Plugfest_04_Intel.pdf and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aV1DSF4cwGw. These tests are run after boot and provide an a posteriori view of the platform.

More recent technology includes having security testability in-situ with the platform, versus a CHIPSEC style post-boot test, and reporting the results. This type of test and reporting capability was mentioned in 2013 at http://www.uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/UEFI_Summerfest_2013_-_Microsoft_Hardware_Security_Test_Interface.pdf and now has a public specification realization at  http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/dn879006.aspx (HSTI) This work bridges the semantic gap historically faced by platform builders wherein the various system requirements in a Windows Hardware Certification document, such as http://download.microsoft.com/download/7/0/E/70E74967-B0FE-477A-974F-C1ED16EE31DF/windows8-1-hardware-cert-requirements-system.pdf, can now have a companion reporting channel. Examples include injunctions in System.Fundamentals.Firmware.UEFILegacyFallback, such as

"An OEM may not ship a 64 bit system which defaults to legacy BIOS or loads legacy option ROMs if that system ships with a UEFI-compatible OS. When Secure Boot is Enabled, Compatibility Support Modules (CSM) must NOT be loaded."
These Compatibility Support Module (CSM) behaviors are something that only the platform implementation can deduce and are difficult to detect via a later test, although heuristics like scanning 0xC0000p through 0x100000p in the address space 'could' be done.

The HSTI interface builds upon the Adapter Interface Protocol (AIP) class of structure defined in the UEFI 2.4 specification http://www.uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/2_4_Errata_A.pdf. Since AIP producers are boot service only, a pre-OS agent needs to query the HSTI interface in order to cull the settings and convey the results into the operating system run time, if needed, in a vendor-specific fashion.

Related work to HSTI that goes beyond mapping to Windows requirements include the ability to report BIOS Integrity Attributes, as described in http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-155/draft-SP800-155_Dec2011.pdf in 3.2.1.1. And in order to surface this information, we defined in http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/files/static_page_files/D4268663-1A4B-B294-D05DE87EE90558B6/TCG_EFI_Platform_1_22_Final_-v15.pdf the following:

    typedef struct {
       UINT32 VendorId;
       EFI_GUID ReferenceManifestGuid;
    } TCG_Sp800-155-PlatformId_EventStruct

This structure can be used to reference an off-machine Reference Manifest (RM). The idea is that the GUID in the structure above would be specific to a vendor, model, and firmware instance in a XML-based manifest document on the platform suppliers website. The schemas are defined in http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/files/resource_files/73638609-1A4B-B294-D0902CC2A13C8697/Reference_Manifest_Schema_Specification_v2.0.r5.pdf, so now it's a set of work items for the industry to map the RM's to platform attributes, such as mentioned in 155.

Who knows, at some point maybe these reporting and testing efforts will all align?

Well, if you have gotten this far, the 'Didn't Read" portion of "Too Long, Didn't Read" (TL;DR) hasn't been the case for you. I'm not sure whether to reward you for your stoicism or not for wading through this entry.

To summarize, 2014 has shows a spate of security-related activities, both by the attackers (BH, CCC) and the defenders (USRT). The firmware-producing and consuming community is acutely aware of assurance concerns and new testing methodologies have been deployed in '14 and are coming in '15, too, including HSTI. I don't necessarily subscribe to the 'Spy versus Spy' aspect of security, or fall into existential angst that the "Defenders Dilemma" is not solvable. Instead, I see many parties passionate about having robust, usable systems and collaboration on art to achieve those goals. Open source, open documentation, open specifications, open platforms,.... All help in the cause.

And if you're still working these last hours of today, pause and have a coffee.
Also, enjoy a happy and safe new year.

Cheers,

V.Z.兹梅